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EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PEACEBUILDING: THE EXIT 






Two events of momentous significance for Cyprus occurred within 
a week in April 2003. Beyond multifarious domestic and regional 
implications, they entail a rare opportunity for the EU to prove its 
own peacemaking and peacebuilding role in the world. First, the 
Republic of Cyprus signed the Union's Treaty of Accession on 
April 16.
1 On 23 April, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash 
announced the (controlled and partial) lifting of restrictions to the 
free movement to and from the occupied territory of Cyprus. The 
latter event's developing potential for good or ill is indeterminate to 
date. Uninitiated non-Cypriots called it "opening of borders", 
revealing thereby confusion on the nature of the Cyprus puzzle. 
Many Greek Cypriots exploited the chance to visit for the first time 
their occupied homes and properties, abandoned since the 1974 
Turkish invasion. As for the Turkish Cypriots, they rushed to 
contradict Denktash’s perennial claim on the alleged inter-
communal Cypriot hostility, while he was "demanding" anew the 
recognition of his secessionist regime ("TRNC"), although such 
recognition has been denied by the world since the November 1983 
UDI. 
 
The probable causes and reasons of Denktash’s strategy and tactics 
can be surmised. But their socio-political, psychological, politico-
cultural and diplomatic implications cannot be deciphered 
independently of the labyrinthine processes at work in, around, and 
about Cyprus. As I shall argue, Denktash’s brilliant (if 
machiavellian) manoeuvre -which, in spite of himself,
2 could stand 
                                                           
1 Until then, the Republic's accession had confronted a series of real and 
imagined obstacles, including the notorious Annan Plan (see below). 
2 In spite of himself, because his perennial aim has been to see the "solution" of 
the Cyprus problem in terms of "two states", "living side by side", etc. 
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only as a Confidence Building Measure- cannot substitute the fair 
and functional solution of the Cyprus problem. The international 
community - here headed by the EU and the UN - has long 
demanded a federated bi-communal and bi-zonal Republic to 
succeed the Republic of Cyprus (established in 1960). Such a 
federation - to be authentically democratic, fair and functional- 
must be founded on a solid normative framework that satisfies the 
fundamental human rights and the genuine human needs of every 
Cypriot. Especially since April 16, therefore, this framework can be 
sustained principally by the European Union. For this Union 
constitutes -simultaneously- the most reliable regional peacemaker 
and peacebuilder and Turkey's own fervently aspired vocation. 
 
To this end, I will argue, first, that the crack to the Green Line is 
causally linked to the Nicosia-Athens policies and the EU decisions 
regarding the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the Union. 
Second, Denktash’s initiative falls under the heading of Turkey's 
diplomatic improvisations associated with its central foreign policy 
preoccupation, i.e., the start of its own EU accession negotiations. 
Third, the post-23 April Cypriot landscape has revealed an entirely 
novel socio-psychological and politico-cultural picture in occupied 
Cyprus, which cannot be ignored by the EU. And fourth, the Union 
now confronts a rare opportunity to act both as a historic conflict 
manager vis-à-vis Cyprus, Turkey and Greece and a Euro-Med 
peacebuilder. Beyond contributing decisively to trilateral détente 
and co-operation for the benefit of the peoples of Turkey, Greece 
and Cyprus, the EU would increase enormously its diplomatic 
prestige while establishing unquestionably that it constitutes "an 
alternative superpower with a moral difference".
3
 
1.  Denktash’s Motives and Nicosia's Response 
 
While Rauf Denktash’s decision is causally related to the EU’s 
historic expansion, the causal chain is far more convoluted. It 
includes, first, the vicissitudes associated with the latest Cypriot 
                                                           
3 For this conception of the EU, see Costas Melakopides, "On the Mediterranean 
'Fuzzy Edge' of the EU: the Candidacies of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey", Journal 
of European Integration, Vol. 22, no. 3, autumn 2000, pp. 299-334. 
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inter-communal negotiations, conducted under the UN Secretary 
General's good offices mission. Responsibility for the negotiations' 
collapse in March 2003 was placed universally on the lap of Rauf 
Denktash.
4 Second, it also sprang from the Republic’s accession to 
the EU, the accession Denktash had long attempted to prevent. 
Finally, the Turkish Cypriots’ anger and frustration towards his 
illegal and ostracised regime had to be confronted. These attitudes 
were demonstrated passionately and repeatedly in December 2002 
and January 2003 in Nicosia’s occupied sector. Around 75,000 
people had demanded "Baris" (i.e. Peace), acceptance of the Annan 
Plan as an avenue to the European Union, the departure of the 
Turkish troops, and the resignation of Rauf Denktash himself. 
 
In other words, Mr Denktash’s impasse - caused by international 
isolation and galloping delegitimation - necessitated a dramatic 
reaction. With 23 April he attempted to regain in one stroke the 
political initiative while confusing, even momentarily, Nicosia's 
legitimate regime. Moreover, he must have counted that any 
friction between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus would verify his 
perennial assertion that they "just cannot live together". Finally, the 
appearance of increased T/C freedom, together with the injection of 
substantial income from the "visiting" G/Cs, might have pacified 
his frustrated community and nullified their anger. 
 
Nicosia responded with a series of social, economic and 
humanitarian measures to support the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, 
it collaborated closely with the European Commission on the 
formal propriety of the aforementioned measures and on additional 
EU-supported measures on behalf of the T/Cs. Needless to say, the 
Government, while sensitive not to appear as resting on its recent 
diplomatic laurels, faced a genuine dilemma: to oppose movement 
across the dividing line might have caused the false impression it 
was rejecting a potent CBM. But the unqualified endorsement of 
such movement risked generating serious discontent among the 
G/Cs. This is primarily because Denktash has demanded from the 
start that the Greek Cypriots show their passports at the dividing 
                                                           
4 See the UNSG Statement to this effect, as read by Kofi Annan on 10 March in 
The Hague. 
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line; that is, show their passports within their own country to an 
unrecognised, hence illicit, regime.
5 Therefore, Greek Cypriot 
frustration and anger could arise from the fear that Denktash might 
exploit politically and psychologically his latest antic. 
 
Conscious that Denktash’s demand is inconsequential from the 
viewpoint of International Law, but aware that such psychological 
warfare is too costly to the Greeks of Cyprus, Nicosia decided to 
leave the matter up to individual "conscience". As a result, opinion 
research in early June 2003 revealed the following: 39% of G/Cs 
had visited the occupied area. 61% had refused to do so, yet 19% of 
them contemplated a future visit to the "North". Those refusing to 
visit were in the main non-refugees. They stated the principal 
reasons for their refusal as follows: "(a) the presentation of their 
passport; (b) the non-recognition of the ´pseudostate´; and (c) the 
trouble they have to go through".
6  
 
Simultaneously, there was widespread satisfaction with the 
dramatic falsification of the Denktashian mythology on the alleged 
inherent hostility between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In 
fact, within weeks after 23 April, hundreds of thousands of persons 
from both communities began mingling in harmony and even 
friendship. As Politis also attested: 
 
                                                           
5 It bears repeating that, 29 years after Turkey's invasion and 20 years since the 
(November 1983) Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the world (except for 
Turkey) has refused to recognize the secessionist "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" ("TRNC"). Hence the Greek Cypriots call it a "pseudostate", following 
the norms of International Law. 
6 See Politis (Nicosia daily), 9 June 2003. Then, in a late September 2003 
opinion poll, conducted by ACNIELSEN/AMER on behalf of Politis,  the 
following figures emerged: 44% of G/Cs have visited the occupied lands for 
“sentimenatl reasons”; 63% of the visitors  (equal to 24% of all Greek Cypriots) 
will not visit again; only 37% of visitors (or 13% of the entire G/C population) 
will continue doing so; of all those who never visited the “north” (56%), only 
14% think they might do so in the future whereas 86% state that they will never 
do so. “They view the showing of their passport as offensive and also believe 
that to present [their passport] constitutes a form of recognition [of the illicit 
regime].” Dionysis Dionysiou, “Why the Greek Cypriots do not visit the 
Occupied Area”, Politis, 23 September 2003. 
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Both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots received a rather 
friendly welcome during their visits. An 83% of Greek Cypriots 
state that they were treated in a friendly way and only 3% in an 
unfriendly way. On their part, 60% of Turkish-Cypriots state that 




Equally substantial, Nicosia keeps emphasizing its eagerness to 
restart the inter-communal negotiations. One qualification, 
however, was inevitable: given the Republic's EU accession, the 
UN Annan Plan must be subjected to the –logically, politically, and 
legally- required modifications. For, among other things, the plan 
had assumed the myth of inter-communal hostility, it digressed 
dramatically from the acquis communautaire, and had treated 
Cyprus' accession to the Union as a future prize to be gained.
8 
Therefore, a brief look at the Annan Plan is necessary. 
 
2.  A Schematic Look at the Annan Plan 
 
Submitted in three rounds (November 2002 to February 2003), the 
plan was hailed in various quarters as the most comprehensive 
design ever produced to handle the Cypriot conundrum. The 
Turkish Cypriots were immediately among its warmest supporters. 
The Greek Cypriots have entertained deeply mixed feelings. At the 
February 16 presidential election, the majority denied re-election to 
Glafkos Clerides who seemed prepared to adopt the plan as it 
stood. This plan, however, can be accused of committing 
significant legal, political and functional sins.
9
                                                           
7 Ibid., 9 June 2003. Most of the incidents of "unfriendly" treatment seemed 
caused by the awkward encounters of Greek Cypriots with colonists from Turkey 
who now occupy their properties and homes. 
8 Remarkably, before March 2003, the Plan's supporters -including UN and other 
mediating officials as well as various G/C politicians- had repeatedly threatened 
that a refusal by Nicosia to endorse the Plan would cause denial of accession by 
the EU! 
9 While no major studies in support of the Annan Plan have been published in 
Greek, three serious critical books are already available: the first by a group of 
five young Cypriot scientists (Emilianides, Kentas, Kontos, Mavromatis and 
Fokaides), the second by Dr. Andreas Theophanous, and the third -The Annan 
Plan: A ´Constructively Ambiguous´ Constitutional ´Future´ for Cyprus - by 
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a.  Legal objections  
 
Serious legal objections derive from the plan's curtailed satisfaction 
of a host of human rights and freedoms, including the rights to 
move, to settle and to own property anywhere in the reconstituted 
quasi-confederal republic. This amounts to the violation of rights 
regarded as sacred and inviolable by the EU’s legal culture. 
Moreover, the Annan Plan’s three versions kept imposing a 
whirlwind of unconscionable deadlines, so as to ascertain 
agreement before 16 April, as a condition for bringing the "United 
Cyprus Republic" to the EU summit in Athens. This imposition 
was oblivious to the fact that most Cypriots entertained a very 
limited and foggy conception of what they were asked to endorse in 
two separate referenda. It also meant a blatant violation of the 1980 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which outlaws coercion 
to compel a state to sign an agreement or a treaty. Needless to say, 
this rush to impose the agreement raised further legal and 
diplomatic eyebrows given its contradicting the acquis 
communautaire. For if it entailed tangible conflicts with elementary 
norms of the EU’s legal culture, why accept the plan as such, 
instead of awaiting the Republic's accession to the Union? After all, 
the legal norms and the legal-political culture of the European 
Union should suffice to liberate all Cypriots from the illegality and 
immorality of a 29-year-old occupation.  
 
The above objections are not premised on the classic democratic 
values of the rights of majorities or "one person, one vote". These 
rights, too, were demonstrably violated by the Annan Plan, 
presumably on the (tacit) ground that the case of Cyprus is sui 
generis. However, this stance contains another unacceptable 
notion: that the established illegality of the 1974 invasion and the 
continued occupation must be entirely "forgiven" so as to facilitate 
a new start. But if such a violation of fundamental international 
                                                                                                                                   
University of Cyprus lecturer, Dr. Savvas Papasavvas. For an endorsement of the 
Plan by a Turkish Cypriot academic, see Ahmed Sozun, "A Model of Power 
Sharing in Cyprus: From the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements to the Annan 
Plan", delivered at the Central and Eastern European International Studies 
Association/ISA International Convention, Budepest, Hungary, June 26-28, 
2003.   
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legal norms were to be so lightly “forgiven”, the respectability of 
International Law would suffer additional irreparable damage. 
 
b. Political  Objections 
 
These indicative legal objections entail profound political 
reservations, including the following: first, any political association 
built on suspected unfairness is bound to generate mistrust. 
Mistrust, in turn, could easily cause the break-up of the constructed 
entity. The Annan Plan has ignored this serious probability. 
 
Second, had a break-up ensued, the formerly condemned as illegal 
secessionist regime would have attained legal validity, as one of the 
envisaged "constituent states". Hence another violation of 
International Law would occur, this time of the time-honoured 
principle, ex injuria jus non oritur (injustice does not create rights). 
Once again, injustice would fuel deep frustration leading to 
mistrust, which would then raise serious questions about the 
functioning of the hurriedly presented new state.
10
 
Third, at the juncture of the legal and the political stood yet another 
conflict with international norms. For if the importation of illegal 
colonists from Turkey constitutes a war crime, then the permission 
to incorporate even 45,000 of them in the United Cyprus Republic 
would represent another source of friction. These colonists have 
been encouraged by the Denktash regime to populate the occupied 
territory, to counterbalance the departure of dozens of thousands of 
frustrated Turkish Cypriots. The problems these colonists have 
created are not just legal, theoretical or metaphysical. They now 
form the majority of the population in occupied Cyprus, having 
reached about 115,000 versus about 88,000 native Turkish 
Cypriots.
11 Moreover, they have been a long-recognised cause of 
                                                           
10 It bears repeating that the rush to impose the plan on the Cypriots sprung from 
the aforementioned desire by the UN (and Washington) to have it approved in 
two referenda before the 16 April signing of the Accession Treaty. 
11 These numbers were provided, for instance, in the 1998 first Regular Report 
from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession. 
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frustration for the latter.
12 A fortiori, therefore, they are capable of 
causing deep frustration to the Greek Cypriots, whose houses and 
property they now occupy. 
 
Fourth, the Annan Plan reintroduced "guarantees" contained in the 
1959 Treaties establishing the Republic. One of them concerns the 
legally condemned abstraction that, should constitutional problems 
arise, the guarantors "would take action".
13 The second one invited 
Greece and Turkey as military guarantors of Cypriot independence. 
Associating the stationing of 6,000 troops from each of these 
countries with the prohibition to the new state to possess its own 
armed forces amounts to the creation of a veritable protectorate at 
the dawn of the 21
st century. 
 
Fifth, the Plan contradicted the prolonged consensus by the 
international community that the new Republic would have to be 
federal. Its real, if slippery, new identity would have been a crypto-
confederal quasi-federation. While the constituent states were given 
ample room for most state activities, the "common state" possessed 
limited sovereignty and no clear power to settle potential scores 
with the constituent parts. In fact, in all cases of legal-political 
conflict, the ball was dropped in another sui generis court, the new 
Supreme Court. With the possible exception of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, such a court is unprecedented: for while some of its  
                                                           
12 The discontent and even anger of the native Turkish Cypriots has long been 
registered. See, for instance, Robert MacDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, 
Adelphi Papers 234, Winter 1988/89; Costas Melakopides, Making Peace in 
Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative, Martelo Paper 15 (Kingston, Ont.: 
Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1996); and Nils Kadritzke, "Turkish 
Cypriots Dream of Europe", Le Monde Diplomatique, August-September 1998. 
13 This notion has been legally condemned for the following reasons. For if it 
were conceived as permitting the use of military force, it would demonstrably 
contradict Article 2 par.4 of the UN Charter. If it were asserted that, as a special 
provision, it superseded the aforementioned article, it would contradict directly 
Article 103 of the Charter. Moreover, Ankara has traditionally claimed that its 
"right to intervene" followed from Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee (attached 
to the Cypriot Constitution). It has failed to mention, however, that this Article 
recognizes a single legitimate ground for "taking action" in case of a 
constitutional anomaly: the return to the constitutional status quo ante. Turkey, 
however, has been occupying 37% of Cyprus since 1974. 
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members would be provided by the two communities in equal 
numbers, the remaining three judges would be foreigners! In other 
words, all cases of political deadlock and impasse were to be 
decided au fond by three non-Cypriot judges. To say, therefore, 
that the new statelet would end up as an undignified protectorate of 
traumatized statehood would hardly seem hyperbolic. And such a 
conclusion arises even before considering that the Plan, by its 
deafening silence, had fully endorsed the continued life on Cyprus 
of the two British sovereign bases that cover just under 3% of the 
Republic’s territory. 
 
c. Functional  Problems 
 
Such an entity, therefore, could hardly succeed in functioning as a 
modern state. Even assuming loads of good will by all, the sense of 
injustice generated could entail that Kofi Annan’s creation might 
collapse within months. In addition, as the clearly more prosperous, 
the majority Greek Cypriots would ultimately carry the new 
financial burden. Therefore, they were essentially asked to support 
materially not only the common state but also the constituent T/C 
state. Given, however, the imposed presence of the colonists and 
their role all these years, it is hard to assume that the G/Cs would 
be eager to support them, that is, support those who have occupied 
their homes and properties since 1974, contributing substantially to 
the violation of their fundamental human rights.  
 
3.  Where do we Stand? 
 
As against the Nicosia Government, Rauf Denktash rejected 
outright the Annan Plan, even as a framework for negotiations. 
Although the plan accorded most of the territory of the illegitimate 
"TRNC" the status of a state in nascendo, Denktash’s maximalist 
"demands" remained unsatisfied. Therefore, the arguments from 
International Law and the norms of civilised global co-existence 
need to be strongly asserted time and again.
14 These arguments´ 
                                                           
14 For a summary of the relevant norms of International Law demonstrating the 
international community’s condemnation of the invasion and the occupation, see, 
for instance, Costas Melakopides, "Causes, Form and Substance of Cyprus' 
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disregard by Denktash and Ankara, and the frequent 
misperceptions by amateurish “experts” on the Cyprus problem, 
have caused profound confusion to less-tutored observers and an 
unconscionable delay in its resolution. However, these arguments 
and associated norms constitute the only valid grounds for the fair, 
democratic and functional resolution of the Cyprus problem and, by 
implication, of both the Greek-Turkish dispute and a great part of 
Turkey’s own EU problems. 
 
In other words, Denktash’s maximalist demands, supported by 
Ankara's intransigence, crystallised as follows. To restart the 
negotiations, the "TRNC" must be recognised: for this constitutes a 
"reality" in tandem with such other "realities" as the existence of 
"two states, two peoples and two democracies".
15 Therefore, the 
Annan Plan is inadequate, since it does not adopt all the 
Denktashian "demands" but asks, instead, the Turkish Cypriots to 
"abandon their homes". Moreover, as regards accession to the EU, 
Denktash holds the untenable thesis that it presupposes 
endorsement of his "two-state" demand. Given, therefore, the clear 
rejection of this presupposition by the European Union, it follows 
that Denktash’s present regime rejects the EU project for the 
benefit of the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
On the broader or "strategic" motives or intentions of Rauf 
Denktash and of his Ankara supporters,
16 two urgent questions 
arise: (1) what is the precise nature of the dependence of Denktash 
on Ankara and vice versa? And (2) is it possible that Ankara's 
decision-makers are finally committed to the EU accession while 
                                                                                                                                   
Human Rights Idiosyncrasies", in Peter G. Xuereb (ed.) The Mediterranean's 
European Challenge, Vol. II (European Documentation and Research Centre, 
University of Malta, 2000), pp. 42-64. For the most sophisticated arguments of 
International Law as they apply to the entire Cyprus Question, see Kypros 
Chrysostomides,  The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2000). 
15 The latter constitutes a statement by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
during a visit to occupied Cyprus on 9 June 2003. 
16 By “his Ankara supporters” I mean “those in Ankara who support Rauf 
Denktash”. For it should be clear by now that “Ankara” is multi-faceted and 
multidimensional, given the various, and conflicting, decision-making power- 
centres. 
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also failing to recognise that Turkey cannot occupy 37% of a soon-
to-be full EU member-state?  
 
The relevant literature has grown to massive proportions. Answers 
to (1) above remain slippery and indeterminate, but most 
convincing seem to be those claiming (a) that the numbers of 
Denktash’s supporters in Turkish elite circles are progressively 
dwindling and (b) that his relevant prestige is now waning (while 
collapsing among the native Turkish Cypriots). Therefore, 
Denktash’s various initiatives could not be autonomous but are 
rather linked to Turkey’s broader foreign policy agenda. As for the 
latter, the relevant issues are necessarily linked to (2).  
 
Leaving aside the argument that the "real decision-makers" (i.e. the 
military leadership) are inimical to EU accession,
17 two main 
schools of thought are here competing. The first argues that the 
"pashas" as part of the entrenched “deep state” are in palpable 
conflict with the newly-elected Erdogan Government. The latter, as 
Europhile, seems prepared for the "honourable compromise" in 
Cyprus. The second school holds that Turkey's policy-makers are 
united in an intransigent stance on Cyprus, presumably expecting 




Now, I wish to offer the following alternative answers, premised on 
the construction of a twofold analytic framework.
19 This 
framework consists, first, of observations on current Turkish 
political culture in association with the underlying political, 
economic and socio-psychological dynamics of present-day 
                                                           
17 The most powerful such case was made by Eric Rouleau in "Turkey's Dream 
of Democracy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, no 6, November-December 2000, pp. 
110-14. 
18 They include the claim that in Cyprus live "two peoples, two states and two 
democracies", as well as Ankara's unmitigated insistence that the Cyprus 
problem is “unrelated” to its EU accession obligations. 
19 Some of the following arguments can be found in Costas Melakopides, 
"Turkish Political Culture and the Future of the Greco-Turkish Rapprochement", 
ELIAMEP Occasional Paper OP02.06, Athens, September 2002, published 
Online at www.eliamep.gr
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Turkish society. Second, it contains propositions concerning the 
Turkish elites’ own geostrategic and geoeconomic conclusions 
concerning Turkey’s broader interests, capabilities and limits, as 
well as its slippery place in the post-Cold War and post-Iraq war 
world.  
 
Accordingly, I submit that after prolonged soul-searching and 
intellectual meandering, Turkey's elites have converged on the 
superior rationality of the "European vocation" for at least two 
reasons. First, because all strategic alternatives - such as Turkey's 
broad ambitions in Transcaucasia and Central Asia - have failed to 
materialize and because the EU contains the richer possible 
promises towards the satisfaction of Turkey's manifold domestic 
needs.
20 And second, a study of recent Turkish political culture 
reveals that, in tandem with the country's strong feelings of self-
confidence and its serious hopes for a successful political and 
socio-economic future, there are simultaneous manifestations of 
insecurity, pessimism, and partial disorientation by some of 
Turkey’s decisive elites. Consequently, Ankara's foreign policy 
could not avoid both serious errors and signs of confusion. 
 
And yet, there is also a feature of Ankara's negotiating techniques 
that Mehmet Ali Birand - referring to Rauf Denktash- has named 
"pazarlik".
21  Pazarlik, or oriental bargaining, may help explain 
some of Ankara's negotiating devices, such as the use of diplomatic 
blackmail, apparent self-contradictions, and calculated ambiguities. 
At bottom, however, the emerging consensus on the wisdom of 
joining the EU seems rather solid. Therefore, pazarlik concerns 
only Ankara's modus operandi or its attempts to maximize the 
                                                           
20 Among them, all-important seem Turkey's needs for "identity" and a solid 
sense of "belonging". These needs could not be met by other strategic 
alternatives, such as strengthening the traditional US-Turkey "strategic 
partnership", even ignoring the serious bilateral crisis surrounding the 2003 Iraq 
war. 
21 The distinguished Turkish journalist and author used this notion, referring to 
the restart of the inter-communal negotiations in December 2001-January 2002. 
Interview with Costas Yennaris, Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, 6 December 
2001. 
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envisaged benefits and to minimize the costs of Turkey's desired 
EU accession. 
 
Therefore, Denktash’s recent antics reflect his desperate state of 
"internal" opposition and international isolation. As such, they are 
probably doomed, given the depth of T/C anger and frustration, 
Ankara’s EU orientation, the international community's rejection of 
his fundamental premises, and Nicosia's strong commitment to "the 
fair and workable solution", on behalf of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots alike. In contrast to Denktash’s devices, such a solution 
should rest on the solid legal principles, the entrenched 
international norms, and the political and legal culture of the 
European Union. 
 
How about the opposition to Denktash? As the political formations 
in occupied Cyprus prepare for their December 2003 elections, two 
messages keep surfacing: first, anger at Denktash’s stalling 
negotiation tactics; and second, a deep commitment to the EU. The 
broad new coalition of the T/C Left, created in the summer of 2003 
under the leadership of left-winger, Mehmet Ali Talat, and social-
democrat leader, Mustapha Akinci, might well form a post-election 
alliance. These political forces seem united on the following three-
dimensional platform: Rauf Denktash must cease being the hostile 
interlocutor in the inter-communal negotiations; the EU can best 
address the occupied territory's maladies and problems; and the 
Annan Plan is a foundation for the desired solution. 
 
How compatible is this platform with the needs of the Greek 
Cypriots? Very schematically, President Tassos Papadopoulos 
espouses the first two of the T/C theses. Together with numerous 
representatives of the international community -including, it would 
seem, Washington itself-
22 he would not shed many tears were 
Denktash to go. Moreover, Nicosia and Greek Cypriot NGOs have 
been at pains to demonstrate authentic commitment to collaborate 
                                                           
22 Among other things, US diplomats have witnessed the massive anti-Denktash 
and pro-EU demonstrations by the Turkish Cypriots in December 2002 and 
January 2003. Moreover, reports in the Greek Cypriot press keep insisting that 
Denktash’s disappointing practices have generated designs by international 
actors that he may soon follow Yasser Arafat’s fate as an interlocutor. 
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with the like-minded political forces and the civil society of the 
T/Cs, in order to complete in tandem the EU accession even before 
1 May 2004. Where the two sides seem to part company is, rather 
inevitably, the last Annan Plan. 
 
Nicosia currently asserts its preparedness to re-open honest and 
sincere negotiations. Simultaneously, it stresses that Accession 
provides the opportunity/obligation to utilize fully the EU’s norms 
and values, for the benefit of all Cypriots.
23  Hence, Nicosia is 
presently studying the relevant nuances, while expecting a new 
international initiative on Cyprus after the December 2002 
developments in occupied Cyprus. 
 
The Republic’s recent stance may be explained as follows. The 
Cypriot labyrinth is once again fluid, especially regarding the 
Turkish Cypriot interlocutor(s). Similar fluidity marks Ankara 
itself. The perceived as entrenched decision-making elites have 
been in apparent friction with the moderate Islamist PM Erdogan, 
on both the EU and Cyprus. Therefore, until the domestic Turkish 
mosaic stabilizes, it seems unwise to take additional initiatives 
beyond this fact: that President Papadopoulos and House Speaker, 
Dimitris Christofias, stress incessantly the Republic’s preparedness 




That this stance seems fully rational may be strengthened by 
additional considerations. First, the diplomatic ball is now in 
Turkey’s court. And Turkey is a candidate for EU accession. For 
some months, Ankara has been actively smoothening the ground to 
                                                           
23 For instance, this was emphasized in the interview of Cypriot Minister of 
Defence, Koulis Mavronikolas, with To Vema tis Kyriakis (Athens), 20 July 
2003. See also note 24 below. 
24 On 3 October 3003, both the Cypriot President and the House Speaker 
expressed this commitment anew. In fact, Dimitris Christofias (who is also 
Secretary General of the left-wing AKEL party) clarified that the solution of the 
Cyprus problem should be premised “on the Security Council resolutions, the 
high-level Agreements [of 1977 and 1979], the principles of International Law 
and the acquis communautaire”. Cyprus News Agency, Phileleftheros On Line, 
3 October 2003. 
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attain a date for the start of accession negotiations. To be sure, 
there are conflicting signals regarding the EU’s eventual stance: 
some member-states have already expressed doubts about the 
practical wisdom of admitting the vast country with its population 
of over 65 million and its social, economic, and political 
idiosyncrasies. Turkey, however, must behave as though the 
positive outcome is all but inevitable. Interestingly enough, the 
diplomacy of Athens, operating with what I have called "the 
Simitis Doctrine",
25 has long been working hard in support of 
Turkey's candidacy. Moreover, Greece seems prepared both to 
continue doing so and to influence various capitals accordingly.
26 
And once the bilateral US-Turkey climate begins to improve, 
Washington should return to being Ankara’s best EU-lobbying 
friend. In any event, by progressively adapting itself to the acquis 
communautaire, Turkey is essentially doing itself a favour. 
Simultaneously, the EU’s values and norms entail Turkey's twin 
obligation: to remove its occupation troops from the territory of a 
Union member-state; and to demonstrate authentic commitment to 
solve the Cyprus problem, according to the norms of International 
Law and the EU’s political culture. For this is the very Union that 
Turkey wants to join. 
 
Second, the Turkish Cypriots surprised most people, including 
Rauf Denktash himself. Their slogans during the massive recent 
demonstrations manifested both their accumulated frustrations and 
                                                           
25 Arguing that Prime Minister Costas Simitis has adopted a balanced synthesis 
of idealism and pragmatism in the post-1996 and, especially, post-1999 foreign 
policy of Greece, I have labelled this synthesis “the Simitis Doctrine". Central 
preoccupations of his foreign policy's content and style have been Greece's 
rapprochement with Turkey in tandem with the "europeanization" of Greek-
Turkish relations and of the Cyprus Problem. For a sketch of this analysis, see 
Costas Melakopides, "Simitis' Doctrine, the EU's Helsinki and the Future of the 
Greco-Turkish Rapprochement", in George Cristian Major and Larry Watts 
(eds.) Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratization, Reform and 
Security (Bucharest: Enciclopedica Publishing House, 2002), pp. 259-280. 
26 In mid-October 2003, however, a perceptible change of rhetoric occurred 
when Greek Minister of Defence, Yiannos Papantoniou, and the Greek 
Ambassador to Washington, George Savaides, both made Greece’s support for 
Turkey’s eventual membership conditional on Ankara’s change of policy in 
Cyprus and the Aegean. Macedonian Press Agency, 14 October 2003. 
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their passion for peace, freedom, human rights, socio-economic and 
cultural development, and, above all, for the European Union. For 
this Union is uniquely placed to guarantee all these values, interests 
and needs. The T/C slogans have demanded the departure of both 
Rauf Denktash and the Turkish troops. The 80,000 or so 
demonstrators explicitly called for Denktash’s resignation. And by 
crying, "This land is ours"
27, they were demanding the departure of 
the 35,000 Turkish troops of occupation. Moreover, while 
increasing their contacts with the Cypriot Greeks, most Turkish 
Cypriots established beyond doubt their considered decision to live 
together again: this time, wiser, kinder and gentler, precisely like 
the Greek Cypriots have decided.
28
 
It follows that Nicosia, with the EU’s help, needs to fully persuade 
the Turkish Cypriots that it truly regards them as “compatriots”. 
Simultaneously, the T/C community should keep asserting its 
commitment to the EU vision, at least by voting against Denktash 
in the forthcoming “elections”.
29 To these parallel obligations we 
must return after reviewing a novel and crucial Cypriot 
development. 
 
4.  Towards a New Turkish Cypriot Identity? 
 
The Turkish Cypriots' frustrated human needs and curtailed human 
rights have generated a drive for a new and multiple consciousness 
                                                           
27 "This land is Ours" is also the umbrella for a number of Turkish Cypriot NGOs 
united by their opposition to the Denktash regime and Turkey's military 
occupation. 
28 On 14 October 2003, about 10,000 Turkish Cypriots repeated their massive 
protests in occupied Nicosia using the very same slogans, where “Peace” and 
“Denktash Resign!” predominated. The protest was accompanied by calls for a 
General Strike in occupied Cyprus. 
29 Indeed they are merely “elections”, both because they are held in an 
unrecognised and illicit regime and because they are already rigged. First, the 
“electoral lists” include the illegal colonists from mainland Turkey. And second, 
by October 2003 thousands of persons were added to them, through extension of 
the (unrecognised) “TRNC “citizenship”, for obvious vote-catching purposes. 
However, the December 2003 vote may help to reveal the depth of anti-Denktash 
and pro-EU sentiments of those living in occupied Cyprus. 
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or "identity". The overwhelming majority of the Turkish Cypriots 
proved to be (sick and) tired of the authoritarian regime, its servile 
dependence on Turkey, and its total failure. This regime could not 
fulfil their elementary social, political, psychological and economic 
needs, violating simultaneously the fundamental human rights 
enjoyed by all Europeans. Among these needs, pride of place is 
clearly occupied by a sense of dignified independence. In addition, 
the T/Cs (and even numerous colonists from Turkey) are now 
convinced that Ankara's and Denktash’s Cyprus policy of 
intransigence, threats and blackmail have frustrated their 
paramount desire to enter the EU.  
 
Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots' symbols and slogans -where the 
EU  predominates- were quite revealing. As opposed to the 
"national" suffocation attained by the illicit regime, a triple identity 
is now dawning for them. Emerging consciously and (in some T/C 
writings) even explicitly, this identity seems ready to synthesise the 
Turkish-Cypriot component of a Cypriot  political consciousness 
under the dream of European  citizenship.  In other words, this 
novel, multifaceted Turkish Cypriot identity seems ready to assert 
"Cypriotness" and simultaneous non-Turkishness  -occasionally 
accompanied even by anti-Turkish feelings-
30 in parallel with, or 
even under, the deeply desired European self-identification.  
 
That the T/Cs associate this multilayered identity with the Annan 
Plan is easy to explain. First, tangible benefits were promised by 
the plan, as opposed to the miserable conditions of the ostracized 
"TRNC" regime. And second, this plan treated the attainment of 
EU membership as a gift or bonus. Therefore, the plan could usher 
in what they have been dreaming for years. However, when 
familiarized with the G/Cs' rational objections, and especially after 
Rauf Denktash is (politically) gone, the Turkish Cypriots should 
reconsider a EU-inspired mode to total Cypriot liberation.  
                                                           
30 Mehmet Ali Birand was shocked to discover the depth of opposition to the 
occupation by T/C students in occupied Cyprus in late 2001. This youth clearly 
expressed their readiness to abandon their birthplace unless a solution to the 
country's problem could lead them to "Europe". See Turkish Daily News, 
November 2001, esp. 16 November 2001. 
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5.  What is to be Done? 
 
The rational actor model can envisage that the T/Cs will ultimately 
favour coupling the federal model with the EU acquis. Anecdotal 
and journalistic evidence supports the notion that numerous, 
especially younger, T/Cs are motivated exclusively by “the EU 
dream” and are prepared to endorse new political experiments to 
this end.
31 A sine qua non condition to strengthen this "coupling" is 
to convince them that Nicosia and the Greek Cypriots desire 
reunified  cohabitation in democratic conditions of functional 
fairness guaranteed by the EU.  Manifestly, the European Union 
itself should explain and encourage this new "marriage". Moreover, 
analysis based on the rational actor model can anticipate that 
Ankara will have to adopt the new synthesis as wholly rational. For 
Turkey’s elites now exhibit a deep EU commitment, confronted by 
the country's most historic opportunity since the 1923 creation of 
the Republic of Turkey.  
 
Manifestly, all Cypriots now deserve the EU’s assistance, to 
expand their mutual understanding and co-operation. I submit, 
however, that most Turkish Cypriots seem unfamiliar with the 
Greek Cypriots´ anxieties and concerns. As distinct from the G/Cs, 
whose opportunities for self-criticism abounded,
32 three decades of 
unmitigated propaganda by the Denktash regime has left its scars. 
                                                           
31 Greek Cypriots, visiting recently their homes and properties in the occupied 
territory, have reported their intuition that many T/Cs seemed prepared to 
reconsider building improvements in the 1960 Constitution. Opinion-makers, 
like (the T/C daily) Africa editor, Sener Levent, have even suggested in print the 
latter idea. And according to reports by my University of Cyprus students, young 
Turkish Cypriots are thinking along similar lines, calling “essentially racist” 
many provisions of the Annan Plan. 
32 It is worth recording here that, as opposed to Rauf Denktash’s adamant refusal 
to recognize the illegality of the invasion and the violation of the human rights of 
all Cypriots, some Turkish Cypriot intellectuals have recently begun a moving 
soul-searching and a profound criticism both of Turkey's actions and of Denktash 
himself. (See note 34 below.) Contrariwise, Greek Cypriot intellectuals have 
long been at pains to cultivate rapprochement with their Turkish Cypriot 
compatriots. In my opinion, they have often gone to self-critical excesses -
especially those cultivating "post-modernist analyses"- thus falling prey to facile 
exploitation by Rauf Denktash. 
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This propaganda demonstrably failed to undermine their 
preparedness for reunification, cohabitation and collaboration with 
the G/Cs under the auspices of the EU. However, while monitoring 
the historic developments of recent months, and especially in my 
personal encounters with T/C intellectuals, I accumulated the 
following perceptions. First, most Turkish Cypriots seem to regard 
themselves as the exclusive victims of the status quo, tending to 
perceive the G/Cs as just rich and happy.
33 Second, they complain 
that the Greek Cypriots left them unassisted in their anti-Denktash 
demonstrations, but without specifying the forms of such possible 
assistance. Third, around 60,000 T/Cs have already applied for 
Republic of Cyprus documents.
34 And while many thousands have 
rushed to utilize the social programmes and other measures Nicosia 
has extended to them, they hesitate to clarify simultaneously their 
stance vis-à-vis Denktash’s antics. Nicosia, therefore, could not 
take for granted that its pro-T/C measures will not be "pocketed" by 
those opposed to a federal reunification through EU membership 
for all.  
 
Finally, disappointing was also my realisation that numerous 
Turkish Cypriot intellectuals appear deeply uncomfortable with the 
legal and ethical arguments condemning the invasion and the 
occupation. Despite the aforementioned acknowledgment by the 
G/Cs of the T/C's bitter memories and present insecurities, 
reciprocation has been minimal to date.
35 However, authentic 
mutual understanding can flourish only when the new Turkish 
Cypriot elites appreciate that the legal and ethical arguments 
employed by the Greek Cypriots to establish their own 
victimization are also advanced by independent analysts of the 
                                                           
33 An explanation -but no justification- of this is provided by the pronounced 
differences of the two communities in terms of standards of living and per capita 
income: the latter for the Turkish Cypriots is calculated around one quarter that 
of the Greek Cypriots. 
34 See the report by Makarios Drousiotis, Eleftherotypia (Athens), 30 August 
2003. 
35 A promising exception was the articles by three Turkish Cypriot public figures 
published in Athens, in July 2003. See "The Metamorphosis of the Turkish 
Cypriots", containing articles by Nigul Orhon, Hasan Kahfegioglu and Sener 
Levent, in Eleftherotypia, 19 July 2003, pp.18 and 47.  
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Cyprus problem and, perhaps more important, by International 
Organizations and the International Courts. In fact, only this 
explains why the world keeps condemning the invasion, the 
occupation, and Denktash’s secessionist regime. 
 
It follows that the Cyprus Government and the EU organs must 
urgently pursue creative political, socio-economic and cultural 
initiatives until 1 May 2004. But because a fair and functional 
Cypriot reunification is unlikely to be locked by then, the 
alternative is December 2004.
36 Such initiatives might include the 
following. 
 
Nicosia is required to handle its dilemma regarding a potential 
"two-door" strategy by supporters of Denktash: namely, the 
"pocketing" of generous socio-economic measures while 
undermining reunification. Of course, Denktash will probably be 
replaced either by the T/Cs themselves or by Ankara, or both. 
Moreover, whatever forces win in December 2003, they will 
confront immediately the inherited political impasse. For beyond 
the T/Cs´ eagerness to join the EU, Ankara itself is now subject to 
close EU monitoring of its entire performance. This makes 
inconceivable Turkey's continued occupation of 37% of the 
territory of a new EU member-state. The Cyprus Government, 
therefore, may keep operating as if "the wheels of History" cannot 
move backwards. What happens, however, if either Turkey's EU 
accession meets serious obstacles or if the new T/C leadership 
performs obstreperously or irrationally? Well, Nicosia will then be 
forced to reconsider its rational stance until the Turkish Cypriot 
community recognises its real interests. That matters need not come 
to such a head, however, should also depend on the EU’s own 
policy, to which I will return. 
 
The legal Government of Cyprus should also keep proving that it 
achieved EU accession on behalf of all legitimate Cypriots. 
Therefore, it can strengthen progressively its socio-economic 
assistance to the Turkish Cypriots, but on the tacit condition that 
                                                           
36 This, of course, is the date when the EU will be announcing its decision on 
granting Turkey a date for the start of its own accession negotiations. 
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this -logically, legally, and psychologically- implies reunification. 
For it would be the height of irrationality and injustice to support 
any persons who enjoy the republic's generous social programmes -
such as medical, educational, or even retirement benefits- while not 
recognising the illegality of the occupation regime. Simultaneously, 
the G/C-T/C "knowledge gap" with respect to the Cyprus problem 
should urgently be bridged.  
 
To this end, the following items may now be given wide publicity:  
first, the accumulated historical, political, moral and legal 
arguments of fair and independent non-Cypriot analysts; second, 
the Cyprus-related decisions of International Courts and 
Organizations;
37 third, the writings of moderate Greek-speaking 
observers on the nuances of the Cyprus problem and on the nature 
of the 29-year old Greek Cypriot victimization; finally, the Turkish 
Cypriots must be informed about the decisions, statements and 
other actions of the various EU organs regarding Denktash’s 




We thus reach the EU’s own opportunity to help resolve one of the 
world's longer, and unnecessarily convoluted, disputes.
39 Until 
December 2004, the EU can indeed assist in various ways. First, it 
could identify the contradictions between the Annan Plan and the 
acquis communautaire. It should also produce functional 
                                                           
37 Pride of place should be allocated here to the European Court of Human 
Rights case, Titina Loizidou versus Turkey, and to Turkey’s protracted (since 
1998) refusal to pay the compensation due to Ms Loizidou for the fact that she 
has been prevented from enjoying the right to her property in occupied Cyprus.  
38 For instance, Commissioner Gunter Verheugen, during his 29 September 2003 
meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul in Brussels, was reported 
by the Macedonian News Agency to have asked on behalf of the Commission, 
“that Turkey should contribute immediately to the solution of the Cyprus 
problem and should not hope to make a last minute bargain in order to extract a 
date for the start of accession negotiations”. Macedonian Press Agency, Brussels, 
30 September 2003 (emphasis added). 
39 It is "unnecessarily convoluted" because International Law has spoken clearly-
and, through the EU and the European Court of Human Rights keeps 
pronouncing- on the illegality and immorality of the 1974 invasion and the on-
going violation of the Cypriots’ human rights.  
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suggestions on the marriage of the latter with the federal model. 
Such an initiative could facilitate dramatically the practical 
resolution of the problem by, inter alia, dispelling any T/C fears 
that the Greek Cypriots wish to capitalize on the Republic’s 
accession for narrow self-regarding reasons.  
 
Second, the EU could softly reiterate the established illegality of 
Denktash’s regime, putting to rest his elaborate and convoluted 
mythology. Of course, the EU has already either implied -with 
diplomatic language- or acknowledged even bluntly this 
illegality.
40 A renewed clarification will now fortify the initiatives 
required to establish the rational coupling of the federal model with 
the EU’s legal norms and political values. 
 
Third, the European Parliament, as the EU’s "moral conscience", 
has repeatedly shown how Turkey's EU road crosses Nicosia’s 
Green Line. It is high time that other EU organs make increasingly 
more clear the direct dependence of Turkey's EU prospects on the 
immediate end of the occupation and on its manifest obligation to 
resolve the problem.  
 
Fourth, the Union may fortify the economic assistance promised to 
the Turkish Cypriot community, on the explicit condition that the 
democratic reunification of Cyprus is implied by such assistance, as 
legally and politically required. Such a "condition" will combine a 
symbolic, a substantive and a crucial pedagogic value. 
 
Fifth, after 16 April 2003, the presence of the EU in Cyprus can be 
strengthened further. EU officials and various committed 
"Europeanists", could be mobilized to clarify to the Turkish 
Cypriots two points. First, that their future benefits go beyond mere 
economic and social advancement: for they give equal priority to 
full human rights and fundamental freedoms. And second, they can 
                                                           
40 See, for instance, the first Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's 
Progress towards Accession (Brussels, November 1998). See also the various 
Reports on Cyprus by the European Parliament, and especially the "Jacques Poos 
Report" of 2000: European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human 
Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, Rapporteur, Jacques F. Poos, 
September 2000. 
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communicate the truth that, unless a fair and democratic 
reunification is attained, it is politically (if not logically) impossible 
for such benefits to accrue. 
 
Sixth, in tandem with the United Nations, the EU can assist in 
Cyprus' peacekemaking and peacebuilding. The EU could now 
send its own officials and representatives to work in situ. Once 
again, this proposal is premised on both symbolic and substantive 
reasons: to further familiarize the Turkish Cypriots with the 
emerging EU-sponsored status of Cyprus; and to assert the Union’s 
status as a diplomatic, political, legal and moral protagonist in the 




The optimism entailed by my reading of the Cypriot-Greco-Turkish 
labyrinth has been founded on a host of facts and reasons. We may 
especially recall, first, the Republic of Cyprus' accession to the 
Union; second, Turkey's indubitable desire to attain its own full EU 
membership; third, the unavoidable "concessions" on Cyprus that 
Ankara is bound to make so as to forge the elevated EU-Turkey 
relationship; fourth, the dramatic change in Turkey's recent 
political culture in clearly pro-EU directions; fifth, the profound 
transformation of Turkey's domestic political mosaic since the 
November 2002 national elections; sixth, the cataclysmic post-
December 2002 changes in the Turkish Cypriots´ perceptions and 
sentiments towards the EU, Ankara and Rauf Denktash; seventh, 
the deepening delegitimation of the Turkish Cypriot leader; eighth, 
the demonstrable benefits to the Turkish Cypriot community 
entailed by a "europeanized" Annan Plan; and ninth, the obvious 
gains for the European Union itself when it brings to an end the 
political and diplomatic headaches generated by Cyprus´ problem 
and, especially, by the occupation of 37% of the territory of one of 
its member-states. It follows that the exit from this labyrinth will 
constitute a major political, legal, diplomatic and moral victory for 
the EU in the Mediterranean on an issue where countless others 
have failed miserably to date. 
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To be sure, it might be objected again that, whereas Turkey is now 
eager to accede to the EU, the latter may not ultimately hold 
reciprocal feelings. My answer here is simply that, even if this full 
membership were proven unattainable easily or soon, the EU-
Turkey relationship is bound to remain real and to become at least 
“special”. Therefore, just as the EU cannot evade its own duties to 
Turkey as a long-awaiting candidate already linked to it with a 
Customs Union, Turkey cannot avoid its clear obligations towards 
the EU’s fundamental values, norms, and rules. Otherwise, Ankara 
risks revisiting the “stigma of unreliability” which is bound to 
undermine its ultimate accession prospects.
41
 
Finally, lest it is supposed that my optimistic reading contains an 
implicit contradiction by employing in tandem the "rational actor 
model" and my "pazarlik hypothesis", let me suggest how these 
analytic devices cohabit harmoniously. What they claim is that the 
hypothesis refers to the mode or the means of Ankara's diplomatic 
(and other) actions, whereas the model addresses Turkey's 
expressed desires and authentic needs. Should it happen, however, 
that rationality fails to win the day in Ankara, such an outcome 








                                                           
41 On this stigma, and how Turkey has tried to handle it after World War II, see 
Selim Deringil, “Turkish Foreign Policy Since Ataturk”, in Clement H. Dodd 
(ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (The Eothen Press, 1992), pp. 1-8. 
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